Sexual Violence, Sanity, and Safety: Constitutional Parameters for Involuntary Civil Commitment of Sex Offenders by Fujimoto, Beth Keiko
COMMENTS
Sexual Violence, Sanity, and Safety:
Constitutional Parameters for Involuntary
Civil Commitment of Sex Offenders
Beth Keiko Fujimoto*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1981, the Washington State Legislature passed the Sen-
tencing Reform Act.1 The Act replaced an indeterminate sen-
tencing structure with a determinate sentencing structure.2
The prior indeterminate sentencing scheme emphasized reha-
bilitation of the offender. In contrast, the determinate Sen-
tencing Reform Act emphasizes punishment proportional to
the severity of the crime committed.4 In addition, the Act pro-
spectively repealed the prior sexual psychopathy commitment
law.5 By repealing the sexual psychopathy statute, the Wash-
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1. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 9.94A (1989 & Supp. 1990, 1990-91).
2. See DAVID BOERNER, SENTENCING IN WASHINGTON 2 (1985). Under the reformed
1984 sentencing system, courts use a statewide sentencing grid that considers the
crime(s) or conviction and the offender's criminal history to establish a standard range
of sentences for every crime, including a minimum and maximum sentence. See
WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.310 (Supp. 1990-91). If the court finds that the crime was
not typical and involved aggravating or mitigating factors, a departure from the
standard range is possible, not to exceed the longest possible term. See id. § 9.94A.390.
Any sentence imposed that goes beyond the standard range is an exceptional sentence.
Id.
3. Brian G. Bodine, Comment, Washington's New Violent Sexual Predator
Commitment System: An Unconstitutional Law and An Unwise Policy Choice, 14 U.
PUGET SOUND L. REV. 105, 113 (1990) (citing BOERNER, supra note 2, at § 2).
4. See State v. Barnes, 117 Wash. 2d 701, 708, 818 P.2d 1088, 1091 (1991); WASH.
REV. CODE § 9.94A.010 (1989); Boerner, supra note 2, at § 2.
5. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 71.06 (1989), repealed prospectively by 1984 Wash. Laws
ch. 209 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 71.06.005 (1989)). Under Washington's repealed
sexual psychopathy statute, a person charged with a sex offense could be committed
indefinitely for treatment of the underlying mental condition predisposing the person
to commit sexual offenses. See id § 71.06.091. Only "sexual psychopaths" were subject
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ington legislature followed a pronounced nationwide trend
away from sexual psychopathy statutes.
6
In the past, states emphasized the treatment of sex offend-
ers through involuntary civil commitment procedures, rather
than punishment after conviction. During the late 1960's, well
over one-half of the states had enacted some form of rehabili-
tative sex offender civil commitment law.7 By 1990, however,
most states, including Washington,' had repealed these stat-
utes.9 This trend away from using civil commitment to treat
sexual offenders was influenced in part by a growing aware-
ness that sex offenders were not mentally ill' and that invol-
to commitment proceedings. See id. § 71.06.020. For comparisons of the current sex
offender involuntary commitment system and the prior Washington sexual
psychopathy commitment system, see Bodine, supra note 3, at 110-13.
For other discussions of sexual psychopathy statutes and issues, see generally
Annotation, Statutes Relating to Sexual Psychopaths, 24 A.L.R.2d 350 (1952); Michael
B. Roche, Note, The Plight of the Sexual Psychopatk A Legislative Blunder and
Judicial Acquiescence, 41 NOTRE DAME LAw. 527 (1966); Allan L. Schwartz,
Annotation, Applicability in Proceedings Under Statutes Relating to Sexual
Psychopaths of Constitutional Provisions for the Protection of a Person Accused of
Crime, 34 A.L.R.3d 652 (1970 & Supp. 1991).
6. See Gary Gleb, Washington's Sexually Violent Predator Law: The Need to Bar
Unreliable Psychiatric Predictions of Dangerousness From Civil Commitment
Proceedings, 39 UCLA L. REV. 213, 215 (1991); Robert J. Favole, Mental Disability in
the American Criminal Process: A Four Issue Survey, in MENTALLY DISORDERED
OFFENDERS: PERSPECTIVES FROM LAW & SOCIAL SCIENCE 247, 270 (John Monahan &
Henry J. Steadman eds., 1983).
7. In 1966, sexual offender commitment systems were in force in 28 states:
Alabama, California, Colorado, Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Florida, Illinois,
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah,
Virginia, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin and Wyoming. Roche, supra
note 5, at 558.
8. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
9. Today, only five states actively utilize their sex offender involuntary
commitment statutes. See Bodine, supra note 3, at 110 (citing SAMUEL J. BRAKEL ET
AL., THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAw 740 (3d ed. 1985)). States such as
California and Washington prospectively repealed their sexual psychopathy statutes.
See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 6300-6330 (West 1984), repealed by 1981 Cal. Stat.
ch. 928 § 2, at 3485; WASH. REV. CODE ch. 71.06 (1989), repealed prospectively by 1984
Wash. Laws ch. 209 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 71.06.005 (1989)); see also Favole,
supra note 6, at 270-81 (noting that Alabama's sexual psychopathy statute was held
unconstitutional in Davy v. Sullivan, 354 F. Supp. 1320 (M.D. Ala. 1973) (recognizing
that Florida, Indiana, Iowa and Vermont repealed their sexual psychopathy statutes)).
Other states currently provide for special sentences and sentencing procedures
following a defendant's conviction for certain sex offenses (sentencing procedures
typically include a psychiatric or similar examination). Special sentences often provide
for treatment of the sex offender; see COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 16-13-201 to -216 (West
1990 & Supp. 1991); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-238 to -257 (West 1988); NEB. REV.
STAT. §§ 29-2911 to -2921 (1985); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:47-1 to -7 (West 1983).
10. For example, when the California Legislature repealed its Mentally
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untary treatment was not effective in reducing recidivism
rates.1' Indeed, the American Psychiatric Association has
questioned the efficacy of treatment of sex offenders.'2 As a
result, the current trend is to punish sex offenders for their
crimes and to provide them with treatment in prison on a vol-
untary basis.
In 1990, the Washington State Legislature broke from this
national trend by becoming the first state to reenact a sex
offender involuntary commitment system, the Sexually Vio-
lent Predators Act.' 3  This new involuntary commitment
scheme appears to be an illegitimate exercise of the State's
police power because it embraces the essential characteristics
of lifetime preventive detention. Such indeterminate preven-
tive detention will likely render the statute unconstitutional.
Why did Washington revive involuntary civil commitment
proceedings for a certain class of sex offenders-"sexually vio-
Disordered Offender Legislation in 1981, it declared: "In repealing the mentally
disordered sex offender commitment, the Legislature recognizes and declares that the
commission of sex offenses is not itself the product of mental diseases .. " 1981 Cal.
Stat. ch. 928, § 4, at 3485, reprinted in CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE, Historical Note
preceding §§ 6300-30 (1984).
11. See H.L.P. Resnik & Marvin E. Wolfgang, New Directions in the Treatment of
Sex Deviance, in SEXUAL BEHAVIORS: SOCIAL, CLINICAL, AND LEGAL ASPECTS 397
(H.L.P. Resnik & Marvin E. Wolfgang eds., 1972); William R. Morrow & Donald B.
Peterson, Follow-up of Discharged Psychiatric Offenders "Not Guilty By Reason of
Insanity" and "Criminal Sexual Psychopaths," 57 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE
SCI. 31 (1966). One commentator reports that a study of California's repealed sexual
psychopathy treatment program found that treatment failed to reduce long-term
recidivism rates, nor has any other program demonstrated its effectiveness. See Gleb,
supra note 6, at 238-39. Further, in its 1977 report, the Group for the Advancement of
Psychiatry commented on the efficacy of sex offender treatment: "[s]ex psychopath
and sex offender statutes can best be described as approaches that have failed." GROUP
FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY, COMMITTEE ON PSYCHIATRY AND LAW,
PSYCHIATRY AND SEX PSYCHOPATH LEGISLATION: THE 30's TO THE 80's at 935 (1977)
[hereinafter GAP Report]. Similarly, in 1978, the President's Commission on Mental
Health urged that "[laws authorizing the involuntary confinement of sexual
psychopaths ... should be repealed." Brief of the American Psychiatric Association as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 11-12, Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364 (1986)
(No. 85-5404) [hereinafter APA Brief] (quoting TASK PANEL ON LEGAL AND ETHICAL
ISSUES OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON MENTAL HEALTH 32 (1978)). Indeed, in the
new sex offender involuntary commitment statute, the Washington Legislature
conceded that no effective treatment exists for sex offenders. "[S]exually violent
predators generally have antisocial personality features which are unamenable to
existing mental illness treatment..." WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.010 (Supp. 1990-91).
12. See APA Brief, supra note 11. In its amicus brief supporting the Allen
petitioner, the APA noted that unlike many mentally ill people, for whom significant
treatment potential exists, sex offenders have proved to be a highly treatment-
resistant group. Id. at 10.
13. 1990 Wash. Laws ch. 3 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE ch. 71.09 (Supp. 1990-91)).
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lent predators"14--only six years after the State prospectively
repealed its prior sexual psychopathy statute? The legisla-
ture's focus on so-called "sexually violent predators" rode the
tide of publicity generated by a trilogy of notorious sexual
crimes15 that were unprecedented in cruelty and unmatched in
subsequent public outrage.'6
Of this trilogy, the egregious circumstances of the Earl
Shriner case especially seemed to compel legislative action. In
1987, Shriner was released from prison after serving a full ten-
year sentence for kidnapping and assaulting two teenage
girls. 7 Near the end of that prison term, Shriner wrote letters
and made drawings of an elaborate, mobile torture chamber
for molesting and killing children.' 8
State corrections officials attempted to commit Shriner for
treatment under the Washington Involuntary Treatment Act
14. A sexually violent predator is defined as "any person who has been convicted
of or charged with a crime of sexual violence and who suffers from a mental
abnormality or personality disorder which makes the person likely to engage in
predatory acts of sexual violence." WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.020(1) (Supp. 1990-91).
Further, "[p]redatory" acts are those "directed towards strangers or individuals with
whom a relationship has been established or promoted for the primary purpose of
victimization." Id. § 71.09.020(3). Thus, under the Act, family members who abuse
individuals within the same family or a person who has an otherwise preexisting
relationship with the victim would not be considered a sexually violent predator.
15. Gene Raymond Kane killed Diane Ballasiotes while on leave through a state
prison work release program in September 1988. Barry Siegel, Locking Up "Sexual
Predators"; A Public Outcry in Washington State Targeted Repeat Violent Sex
Criminals. A New Preventive Law Would Keep Them in Jail Indefinitely, L.A. TIMES,
May 10, 1990, at Al. At the time of his release, Kane had served a full sentence for
attacking two women in 1975. Id. Next, in December 1988, Gary Minnix broke into a
woman's apartment, raped her, and attacked her with a knife. Id. at A31. Minnix had
previously been found incompetent to stand trial for similar offenses. Id. Finally,
recently paroled, Earl Shriner kidnapped, sodomized, and sexually mutilated a seven-
year old boy and choked the child nearly to death. Id. at A30.
16. Ironically, public attention given to sex offenses committed by "sexually
violent predators" appears to be disproportionate to the incidence of sex abuse caused
by other types of offenders. Nationally, it appears that sex offenses are more likely to
be caused by persons having a pre-existing relationship with the victim: "Building on
figures from studies conduced by Dr. Mary Koss, a professor of psychiatry at the
University of Arizona ... [one expert] estimates that women 'are actually four times
more likely to be raped by a man they know than by a stranger.'" Helaine Olen &
Ronald J. Ostrow, Date-Rape Gains Attention After Years as Taboo Topic; Crime:
Authorities Aren't Sure Whether the Problem is Increasing or Victims are Just More
Willing to Speak Up, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 23, 1991, at Al.
17. Siegel, supra note 15, at A30.
18. Kate Shatzkin, Lack of Remorse Key in Sentence for Shriner, Exceptional 131-
year Term Given For Mutilation of Tacoma Boy, THE SEArrLE TIMES, Mar. 27, 1990, at
Cl.
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(ITA)'9 because they believed he posed a danger to the com-
munity.2 ° Shriner, however, could not be committed under the
ITA because he failed to meet two criteria for involuntary
commitment: he was not mentally ill2 ' and he had not per-
formed any overt act during confinement that demonstrated
his dangerousness to himself or others.22 Consequently,
Shriner was paroled, and approximately two years later, he
assaulted a Tacoma boy.23 Largely in response to the Shriner
case, the Washington Legislature enacted the new involuntary
commitment system for "sexually violent predators. "24
19. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 71.05 (1989).
20. See Siegel, supra note 15, at A30.
21. See WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.150 (1989). The ITA requires, in pertinent part,
"[w]hen a mental health professional ... receives information alleging that a person,
as a result of a mental disorder, presents a likelihood of serious harm to others ...
such mental health professional .... may .... file a petition for initial detention." Id.
§ 71.05.150(1)(a) (emphasis added). Subsequent involuntary commitment proceedings
also require that a mental disorder is the cause of the person's dangerousness to
others. See id. § 71.05.150(1)(b) (court may order the mentally ill person to appear for
a 72-hour evaluation and treatment); § 71.05.240 (probable cause hearing is required to
determine the existence of a mental disorder and dangerousness before fourteen-day
involuntary treatment period is imposed); § 71.05.280 (judicial hearing requires finding
of a mental disorder before involuntarily commiting person for maximum 180-day
treatment).
22. The Washington Supreme Court construed the ITA to require a recent overt
act demonstrating the person's imminent dangerousness. In re Harris, 98 Wash. 2d
276, 284, 654 P.2d 109, 113 (1982) ("We thus interpret RCW ch. 71.05.020 as requiring a
showing of a substantial risk of physical harm as evidenced by a recent overt act.")
23. See Siegel, supra note 15, at A30. In March 1990, having been convicted of
attempted murder, first-degree assault, and two counts of first-degree rape for the
assault on the Tacoma boy, Shriner was sentenced to 131 1/2 years. See Shatzkin,
supra note 18 at C1. The prosecution had recommended a 600-year term. Id. Shriner's
exceptionally long sentence seems to represent a trend toward increasingly long prison
terms, terms that are well beyond the guidelines established by the determinate 1984
Sentencing Reform Act. See Herb Robinson, Nearly All Criminals Serve Short Terms,
THE SEArLE TIMES, May 18, 1990, at As. Sentencing judges apparently have been
responding to public outrage urged on by prosecutors and advocates for crime victims'
families. Id.
24. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 71.09 (Supp. 1990-91). While the names Earl Shriner and
Gene Kane were still nightmares haunting the collective mind of the public, the
governor appointed 24 members to a Governor's Task Force on Community Protection.
See GOVERNOR'S TASK FORCE ON COMMUNITY PROTECTION, DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL
AND HEALTH SERVICES, FINAL REPORT I-1 to 1-7 (1989) [hereinafter TASK FORCE
REPORT]. After holding hearings throughout the state, the Task Force recommended a
comprehensive strategy for dealing with sex offenders falling into three broad
categories: offender control and treatment, victim services, and community protection.
Id. at I-1. The Sexually Violent Predators Act was only one component of the 1990
Community Protection Act and was largely based on the Task Force's
recommendations. The Community Protection Act also (1) increased jail terms for all
sexual offenders; (2) increased prison terms for repeat offenders; (3) extended post
prison supervision of convicted sex offenders; (4) imposed stricter control over
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The Washington Sexually Violent Predators Act involun-
tary commitment system is unique in at least two respects.25
First, commitment proceedings may be initiated only against
persons currently confined for certain "sexually violent
offenses" 2 who are about to be released.27 Additionally, the
prosecutor may seek the commitment of a convicted sex
offender previously confined, but returned to the community,
if the prosecutor decides that the person appears to be a sexu-
ally violent predator.2" Second, the Act does not require that a
new criminal charge be brought to initiate commitment
proceedings.'
Does the Sexually Violent Predators Act's involuntary
civil commitment system withstand constitutional scrutiny?s°
Civil libertarians say no."1 The State maintains that it does. A
recent United State Supreme Court decision provides a frame-
offenders placed in community outpatient programs; (5) decreased amounts of early
release credit due to "good time" served by sexual offenders; (6) required sex
offenders to register with the Washington State Patrol; and (7) established community
notification procedures to take effect upon the imminent release of a sex offender
from custody. Community Protection Act, 1990 Wash. Laws ch. 3, Parts I, II, III, IV,
VII and VIII; see also Bodine, supra note 3, at 106; cf TASK FORCE REPORT, suPra, at
III-I to 111-90.
25. See infra Part IV and accompanying text for a more detailed discussion of the
sex offender involuntary commitment system's provisions.
26. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 71.09.020(4), .030 (Supp. 1990-91).
27. See WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.030 (Supp. 1990-91). Under the statute,
commitment proceedings may be initiated against (1) persons currently serving a
prison term for a sexually violent offense whose term is about to expire; (2) a person
previously charged with a sexually violent offense, found incompetent to stand trial,
who is about to be released; or (3) a person found not guilty by reason of insanity if it
appears that the person may be a "sexually violent predator." Id. Compare the
Washington statute, id, with COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-13-203 (1990) (authorizing the
court to commit sex offenders during sentencing phase following conviction of a sex
offense); and ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, 105-3 (Smith-Hurd 1980) (authorizing the
prosecution to initiate commitment proceedings when a person is charged with a
sexual offense, and no prison time has been served); and N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:47-1
(West 1982) (authorizing the court to sentence sex offenders for treatment following
conviction of sex offense).
28. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.030 (Supp. 1990-91).
29. Compare WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.030 with Colorado, Illinois, and New Jersey
statutes, supra note 27.
30. See infra notes 48-53 and accompanying text for the constitutional
requirements of involuntary civil commitment proceedings.
31. One recent commentator argues that the Washington sex offender involuntary
commitment statute fails the procedural due process, substantive due process, and
equal protection requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution. See Bodine, supra note 3. On the other hand, another commentator
argues that the Washington sex offender involuntary commitment system meets due
process requirements; however, it is inadequate to prevent erroneous confinement.
Gleb, supra note 6, at 233-38. Further, Gleb argues that the system meets equal
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work for analyzing the constitutionality of the Washington sex
offender involuntary commitment provisions.32
In 1986, the United States Supreme Court considered
whether the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimina-
tion applied to involuntary commitments under the Illinois
Sexually Dangerous Persons Act 33 in Allen v. Illinois.34  The
constitutionality of the Illinois sex offender commitment
scheme was not the precise issue before the Court. It appears,
however, that Allen implicitly establishes that a sex offender
involuntary commitment law, which is substantially similar to
the Illinois statute and in accord with the Supreme Court's
analysis in Allen, will be upheld as constitutional. It also
appears that a statute meeting these standards will not amount
to unconstitutional lifetime preventive detention.3 5
protection requirements although he concedes that sexual predators are more easily
committed than other civil confinees. Id. at 229-33.
To date, four sex offenders have been involuntarily committed under the Act.
Appeals testing the constitutionality of these commitments have been working their
way through Washington courts. On December 5, 1991, the Washington Supreme
Court heard oral arguments on consolidated appeals by two persons adjudged to be
"sexually violent predators" under the Act and subsequently committed. In re Young,
No. 57837-1 (Wash. filed Feb. 4, 1991). A case testing the Sexually Violent Predators
Act's civil commitment provisions seems certain to come before the United States
Supreme Court.
32. The Court's disposition of Foucha v. Louisiana, 112 S. Ct. 1780 (1992) is also
likely to influence the disposition of a federal constitutional challenge to the statute.
A Louisiana statute allows the state to confine an insanity acquittee who is no longer
mentally ill for an indefinite period, solely on the ground that the person may be a
danger to himself or others. See LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 655 (West 1981 &
Supp. 1991). The Court, in an opinion delivered by Justice White, held that the
Louisiana statute violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment because the law allowed insanity acquitees to be indefinitely
committed solely upon a finding of dangerousness. Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1787-88. The
Louisiana statute is similar to the Washington Sexually Violent Predators statute; as a
result, the Court's decision in Foucha will be influential if the Court considers the
constitutionality of the Washington statute in the future. For a further discussion of
Foucha, see James W. Ellis, Limits on the State's Power to Confine "Dangerous"
Persons: Constitutional Implications of Foucha v. Louisiana, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L.
REV. 635 (1992); John Q. La Fond, Washington's Sexually Violent Predator Law: A
Deliberate Misuse of the Therapeutic State for Social Control, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L.
REV. 655 (1992).
33. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch 38, 105-1.01 to 12 (Smith-Hurd 1980 and Supp. 1991).
For a discussion of the provisions of the Illinois Act, see inrfra Part ILIA.
34. 478 U.S. 364 (1986).
35. See infra notes 79-85 and accompanying text discussing Allen. When the
Washington Supreme Court heard oral arguments on In re Young, many questions
from the bench were devoted to the Washington scheme's constitutionality under
Allen. At the time of this publication, the court had not yet issued an opinion on
Young; however, it appears to be likely that the Young opinion will utilize an Allen
analysis.
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Accordingly, this Comment will address two questions: (1)
whether the Washington law is substantially similar to or fun-
damentally different from the Illinois statute; and (2) whether
the Washington statute should be upheld as a constitutional
exercise of the state's civil commitment authority under Allen
v. Illinois. This Comment argues that the Washington scheme
is fundamentally different from the Illinois statute under
Allen because it is essentially a lifetime preventive detention
scheme and therefore fails to meet the constitutional require-
ments set forth in Allen.
To that end, Part II of this Comment generally explores
the involuntary commitment of sex offenders, the constitu-
tional standards for police power commitments, and the issue
of preventive detention. Part III discusses provisions of the
Illinois Sexually Dangerous Persons Act as well as Allen v.
Illinois, concluding that Allen implicitly established a four-part
test to judge the constitutionality of sex offender involuntary
commitment statutes. Part IV discusses the relevant provi-
sions of the Washington Sexually Violent Predators Act and
compares the Washington statute with the Illinois Act.
Finally, Part V concludes that the Washington statute fails
under the analysis of Allen and is therefore unconstitutional.
II. POLICE POWER INVOLUNTARY COMMITMENT OF SEXUAL
OFFENDERS: THE PREVENTIVE DETENTION QUESTION
Under either its parens patriae3 6 authority or police
power, the state may civilly commit individuals who are men-
tally disordered for control and treatment." The state's
parens patriae authority allows the state to act on behalf of
mentally ill persons who are incapable of protecting their own
welfare.3 8 Most state parens patriae commitment statutes
authorize the involuntary commitment of individuals who are
mentally ill and, as a consequence, are unable to make respon-
sible treatment decisions, are gravely disabled, or are unable to
care for their personal safety.3 9
36. Literally, "parens patriae" means "parent of the country" and refers to the
role of the state as sovereign and guardian of persons under legal disability. West
Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1079, 1089 (2d Cir. 1971).
37. John Q. La Fond, An Examination of the Purposes of Involuntary Civil
Commitment, 30 BuFF. L. REV. 499 (1981).
38. Id. at 504.
39. Id. (citations omitted); see e.g. Washington's Involuntary Treatment Act,
WASH. REV. CODE ch. 71.05 (1989).
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The Washington law is not an exercise of the state's
parens patriae authority. It does not purport to protect the
interest of persons who are functionally incapacitated and who
are consequently unable to protect their own welfare. On the
contrary, the explicit purpose of the Sexually Violent
Predators Act is to protect the community.40
Under its police power, the state has authority to prevent
harm to the community.4' Courts have traditionally given
great deference to legislative enactments concerning the appro-
priate exercise of this power.42 Most states authorize tempo-
rary, emergency commitment of persons deemed to be
mentally ill and dangerous to self or others.43 The duration of
confinement is permissibly indeterminate" because a mentally
40. See WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.010 (Supp. 1990-91). The stated purpose of the
statute is to prevent the committed person from harming members of the community:
The legislature finds that a small but extremely dangerous group of sexually
violent predators exist [who may not be committed under the Involuntary
Treatment Act, WASH. REV. CODE ch. 71.05] ... which is intended to be a
short-term civil commitment system that is primarily designed to provide
short-term treatment to individuals with serious mental disorders and then
return them to the community. In contrast .... predatory sexually violent
predators generally have antisocial personality features ... (rendering] them
likely to engage in sexually violent behavior. The legislature further finds
that sex offenders' likelihood of engaging in repeat acts of predatory sexual
violence is high. The existing involuntary commitment act .... is inadequate
to address the risk to reoffend ....
Id. Because this Comment argues that the Washington sex offender involuntary com-
mitment statute is not an exercise of the State's parens patriae authority, parens
patriae commitment standards are not discussed. Note, however, that other commen-
tators view the Washington scheme as a combined exercise of the state's parens
patriae and police power commitment authority. See Bodine, supra note 3, at 108-09;
cf. Gleb, supra note 6, at 229, 249 (incapacitation and parens patriae authority). For a
discussion of parens patriae commitment standards, see La Fond, supra note 37, at 516-
25.
41. La Fond, supra note 37, at 501.
42. Id.
43. Id. For example, the Washington ITA authorizes the emergency detention of
persons who, as a result of mental illness, present an "imminent likelihood of serious
harm to himself or others," as evidenced by the following behaviors: (a) having
threatened or attempted self-inflicted physical harm or suicide; (b) having harmed or
caused a substantial risk of harm to others in the past, or having placed others in
reasonable fear of sustaining harm; or (c) having caused substantial loss or damage to
the property of others. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.050, .020(3) (1989).
44. [T]he right to restrain an insane person of his liberty is found in that great
law of humanity which makes it necessary to confine those whose going at
large would be dangerous to themselves or others .... And the necessity
which creates the law creates the limitation of the law. The question must
then arise in each particular case whether a patient's own safety, or that of
others, require that he should be restrained for a certain time, and whether
restraint is necessary for his restoration or will be conducive thereto. The
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ill person committed pursuant to the state's police power may
be confined against his will only until he or she is no longer
dangerous.4" The Washington statute is an exercise of the
state's police power; under the statute, the state may isolate a
sexual offender in a state facility in order to protect society
from harm.4 6
As the United States Supreme Court has stated, the per-
missible purpose of police power involuntary civil commitment
is to treat the individual's mental illness and to protect the per-
son and society from the person's potential dangerousness.4 7
Absent a recognized mental disease or defect and an authentic
therapeutic purpose, however, confinement to prevent possible
recidivism is, in effect, simply preventive detention to prevent
future harm.
Therefore, the state's police power is limited in purpose
and in scope by these constitutional requirements. Both the
federal and Washington state constitutions stringently restrict
the government's ability to incarcerate a citizen against his or
her will solely on the belief that incarceration may prevent
future harm to the community.48 The state may utilize preven-
tive detention only by demonstrating a compelling state inter-
est, achieved with means not excessive in relation to the ends
sought.49 Additionally, persons subject to preventive detention
must be provided with constitutionally effective procedural
protections. 5°
The United States Supreme Court has upheld preventive
detention schemes only in extraordinary and rare circum-
stances. Indeed, the earliest approved uses of preventive
restraint can continue as long as the necessity continues. This is the
limitation and the proper limitation ....
La Fond, supra note 37, at 503 n.17 (quoting In re Oakes, 8 LAw REP. 122 (Mass. 1845)).
45. La Fond, supra note 37, at 501.
46. See supra note 40, discussing the purpose of the statute.
47. Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 368 (1983).
48. Every citizen is guaranteed the right to liberty. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV;
WASH. CONST., art. I, § 3. The state may deprive a person of the right to liberty only
after providing due process of law. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV; WASH. CONST., art. I,
§ 3.
49. Because preventive detention impinges on a person's liberty interest under the
Fourteenth Amendment, preventive detention schemes are subject to strict scrutiny
under the Due Process Clause. In other words, the state interest must be compelling
and the means used must be narrowly tailored to achieve the objective. See
Developments in the Law-Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87 HARV. L. REV.
1190, 1223-24 (1974).
50. See generally United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
[Vol. 15:879
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detention arose out of war and insurrection. 1 More recently,
the Supreme Court has permitted the government to detain
dangerous individuals pending other judicial proceedings.52
Even then, however, the government's authority is severely
circumscribed. The government may preventively detain citi-
zens to prevent harm only in cases where significant harm
clearly appears to be imminent, and then only for a very brief
period.53 The Supreme Court has never authorized lifetime or
even long-term commitment of individuals solely because they
were considered likely to commit a crime at some undeter-
mined time in the future.
Thus, if a sex offender involuntary commitment system
does not require a mental disorder and effect treatment, or if it
subjects the person to unnecessarily long confinement, the sys-
tem is not a proper exercise of the state's civil commitment
police power. Instead, the commitment merely accomplishes
unconstitutional preventive detention.
III. THE ILLINOIS SEXUALLY DANGEROUS PERSONS ACT AND
ALLEN V. ILLINOIS
Illinois is among a handful of states that retains a sexual
psychopathy statute.54 In some respects, the provisions of the
Illinois statute are similar to Washington's Sexually Violent
Predators Act. As illustrated below, however, Illinois's statute
51. For example, in Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160, reh'g denied, 335 U.S. 837
(1948), the Court approved the exercise of unreviewable executive power to detain
enemy aliens in time of war. Earlier, in Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U.S. 78 (1909), the
Court rejected the due process claim of an individual who had been jailed without
probable cause by a governor in a time of insurrection.
52. For example, the Court has validated the warrantless arrest and detention of a
person suspected of a crime for 48 hours prior to a magistrate's determining if probable
cause existed. County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 111 S. Ct. 1661 (1991); see also
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975). The Court has also upheld the detention of
potentially dangerous resident aliens pending deportation proceedings. Carlson v.
Lander, 342 U.S. 524, 537-42, rehg denied, 343 U.S. 988 (1975); see also Wong Wing v.
United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896).
53. The Supreme Court has upheld the short-term confinement of dangerous
criminal suspects prior to trial if compelling reasons exist. For example, the Court
validated the incarceration of a person arrested until trial if he presented a risk of
flight. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 534 (1979). Similarly, the Court has upheld the 17-
day pretrial detention of juveniles considered to be at "serious risk" of committing a
crime. See Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984). Finally, the Court has validated a
provision of the federal Bail Reform Act which allows the pretrial detention of an
arrestee if no release conditions "will reasonably assure ... the safety of any other
person and the community." United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 741 (1987) (quoting
the Bail Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) (Supp. III 1983)).
54. See supra note 9.
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is fundamentally different from the Washington scheme in sev-
eral crucial respects.55
In 1986, the United States Supreme Court decided Allen v.
Illinois,' a case involving procedures and rights under the Illi-
nois Sexually Dangerous Persons Act. The narrow issue
before the Court did not address the statute's constitutional-
ity.57 However, the Court's decision in Allen, given the provi-
sions of the Illinois statute, implicitly established a four-part
test for determining the constitutionality of sex offender invol-
untary commitment statutes.
Therefore, if the Washington statute is substantially simi-
lar to the Illinois statute, and meets the Allen criteria, the stat-
ute should be upheld as a valid involuntary commitment
scheme. If, however, the Washington Sexually Violent
Predators Act is fundamentally different from the Illinois stat-
ute or fails to meet any of the Allen criteria, the Washington
statute will be unconstitutional.
Accordingly, this Part first discusses the provisions of the
Illinois Sexually Dangerous Persons Act. Second, it discusses
the constitutional criteria for sex offender involuntary commit-
ment schemes suggested by Allen v. Illinois.
A. The Illinois Sexually Dangerous Persons Act5"
Illinois' sex offender civil commitment legislation was ini-
tially enacted in 1938 and then reformulated in 1955." In 1963,
the legislation was incorporated into the Illinois Code of Crimi-
nal Procedure.
In its original form, the legislation was considered an
expansion of the concepts of fitness and sanity; it was designed
to prevent persons with sexually-related mental disorders from
being tried. 60 When the legislation changed from the initial
Criminal Psychopathic Persons Act to the present Sexually
Dangerous Persons Act, the legislation's purpose shifted to
55. See infra Part IV (comparing the Illinois Sexually Dangerous Persons Act and
the Washington Sexually Violent Predators statute).
56. 478 U.S. 364 (1986).
57. See infra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
58. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, $ 105-1.01 to 12 (Smith-Hurd 1980). For another
discussion and proposed reform of the Illinois Sexually Dangerous Persons Act, see
Joseph F. Grabowski V, Comment, The Illinois Sexually Dangerous Persons Act: An
Examination of a Statute in Need of Change, 12 S. ILL. U. L.J. 437 (1988).
59. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, 820.01 to 825e (Supp. 1960).
60. People v. Redlich, 83 N.E.2d 736, 739-40 (Il. 1949).
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providing treatment for the class of sex offenders falling
within its provisions.6 ' In addition, the Act seeks to protect the
public from the accused until the person's treatment has been
effected.6" The Act explicitly states that it is civil in nature.63
1. Mental Disorder Required
To be a "sexually dangerous person" under the Illinois
Act, the person must have a "mental disorder" continuously
for at least one year immediately before the petition's filing.'
The Illinois statute does not define "mental disorder.
65
2. Convict and Punish or Commit and Treat
The Attorney General or Prosecutor may initiate danger-
ousness commitment proceedings under the Illinois Act only
when a person is charged with a criminal offense indicating
sexual dangerousness." Significantly, the initial criminal
charge and dangerousness proceeding under the Act are inter-
dependent: if the underlying criminal charge fails, the com-
61. People v. Burkhart, 452 N.E.2d 375, 377 (Ill. 1983).
62. Id.
63. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, 105-3.01 (Smith-Hurd 1980 & Supp. 1991). Although
the statute makes proceedings under the Act explicitly civil, the statute also provides
for certain procedural protections normally found in criminal trials. For example, to
commit a defendant to confinement under the Act, the State must meet the burden of
proof required in criminal proceedings: beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. This required
higher standard of proof is in accordance with the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979). In Addington, the Court held that
the Fourteenth Amendment requires at least a "clear and convincing" standard of
proof in involuntary state civil commitment proceedings. Id. at 433.
In addition to the criminal law standard of proof, the Illinois law also provides for
other criminal procedural protections. The Act confers on the defendant the right to
demand a jury trial and to be represented by counsel. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, 105-5
(Smith-Hurd 1980). The Washington statute also entitles the person to similar
criminal procedural protections. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 71.09.050, 71.09.060 (Supp.
1990-91).
64. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, 105-1.01 (Smith-Hurd 1980). "[Slexually dangerous
persons" are
[aIll persons suffering from a mental disorder, which mental disorder has
existed for a period of not less than one year, immediately prior to the filing
of the petition hereinafter provided for, coupled with criminal propensities to
the commission of sex offenses, and who have demonstrated propensities
toward acts of sexual assault or acts of sexual molestation of children[.]
65. This Comment uses the terms "mental disorder" and "mental illness"
interchangeably. See infra notes 110, 116-18 and accompanying text discussing "mental
disorder."
66. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, 105-3 (Smith-Hurd 1980).
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mitment proceeding cannot continue.
Under the Act, the State must make an election at the
time the defendant is charged: either to punish or to treat, but
not both. The prosecution must either prosecute the accused
for the criminal offense or seek his commitment as a sexually
dangerous person.68 Because the prosecution may not seek
both to punish and to treat, the state cannot first obtain a con-
viction for the criminal offense and then proceed to commit
him as sexually dangerous based on the same incident.6 9 A for-
tiori, the State cannot require a convicted sex offender to serve
his full prison term and then commit him indefinitely for
treatment. Thus, the Illinois Act provides for psychiatric care
in lieu of criminal prosecution, not in addition to it.70
3. Procedures For Release; Conditional Release Authorized
If the defendant is adjudged to be sexually dangerous, he
is committed to the custody of the Illinois Department of Cor-
rections.7 ' The Department has two responsibilities: (1) to
"keep safely the person so committed" until he has recovered;
and (2) to provide the committed person with care and treat-
ment designed to effect recovery.7 2
The period of the sexually dangerous person's commit-
ment is therefore indefinite in duration. However, at any time
following commitment, the person may file an application
showing that he has recovered and petition for release.73
Moreover, under Illinois Department of Corrections regula-
tions, a staff psychiatrist is required to review the progress of
persons confined at least every six months. 74
The committing court must hear all applications for
release.75 If the person is found to be no longer dangerous, the
court orders the person discharged; every outstanding informa-
tion and indictment underlying the present criminal charge is
quashed. On the other hand, if the court finds that the person
67. People v. Nastasio, 168 N.E.2d 728, 732 (Ill. 1960).
68. People v. Patch, 293 N.E.2d 661, 665 (Ill. 1973).
69. Id.
70. See People v. Allen, 481 N.E.2d 690, 695 (Ill. 1985), aff'd 478 U.S. 364 (1986).
71. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, 1 105-8 (Smith-Hurd 1980).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 105-9. The Department of Corrections is required to submit a socio-
psychiatric report in response. Id. The application is heard by the court which
originally committed the person.
74. 8 Ill. Reg. 14501 (1984).
75. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, 105-09 (Smith-Hurd 1980).
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has not recovered and continues to be dangerous, the person
remains in the custody of the Department of Corrections.76
Finally, if the court cannot determine with certainty that
the person is no longer dangerous, a conditional discharge is
available subject to terms and conditions that will adequately
protect the public.
77
B. Allen v. Illinois
78
In Allen, the Supreme Court implicitly upheld the consti-
tutionality of the Illinois Sexually Dangerous Persons Act,
which permits the indeterminate commitment of persons in
lieu of conviction and punishment.79 Recall that under the Illi-
nois statute, the state must either convict and punish the
accused or commit and treat him; the state cannot do both.0
As we shall see later, this mandatory election was crucial to
the Court's holding. 1
The Allen Court held that proceedings under the Illinois
statute were civil rather than criminal.8 2 Therefore, the Fifth
76. Id.
77. Id. This conditional release may be revoked if the person violates any terms of
the release order. Id.; see e.g. People v. Davis, 468 N.E.2d 172 (Ill. 1984).
78. 478 U.S. 364 (1986). For an additional discussion and analysis of Allen, see
Grabowski, supra note 58, at 441-47.
79. See supra notes 66-70 and accompanying text.
80. See supra notes 66-70 and accompanying text.
81. See infra notes 93-98 and accompanying text.
82. Allen, 478 U.S. at 375. Petitioner Terry Allen was charged with the crimes of
unlawful restraint and deviate sexual assault. Id at 365. The State also petitioned to
have Allen declared a sexually dangerous person under the Illinois Sexually
Dangerous Persons Act. Id. Both the charges and the petition were initially
dismissed. Subsequently, however, Allen was recharged and the petition to declare
him sexually dangerous was reinstated. Id. at 366.
As provided in the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act, with Allen and his counsel
present, the trial court ordered Allen to submit to two psychiatric examinations. Id.;
see ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, 105-4 (Smith-Hurd 1980). At the trial, the State presented
the testimony of the two examining psychiatrists over Allen's objections that the
doctors had elicited information from him in violation of his Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination. Allen, 478 U.S. at 366. The trial court ruled that
Allen's statements to the psychiatrists were not themselves admissible. However, the
court allowed each psychiatrist to give his opinion based on his interview with Allen.
Both psychiatrists testified that Allen was mentally ill and had criminal propensities
to commit sexual assaults. Based on the testimony of the psychiatrists and the victim
of the sexual assault for which Allen had been indicted, the court found Allen to be a
sexually dangerous person under the Act. Id.
The Illinois Supreme Court held that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination was not available in sexually dangerous person proceedings for two
reasons. First, the court decided that such proceedings were civil and not criminal in
nature, with the statutory goal of "treatment, not punishment." People v. Allen, 481
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Amendment did not apply to psychiatric evaluations conducted
in accordance with the Act.8" Justice Rehnquist, writing for
the five-member majority,84 established a four-prong analysis
for determining when indefinite confinement schemes for sex
offenders should be considered a constitutional exercise of the
state's civil commitment authority. The statute must (1)
require a mental illness; (2) disavow any interest in punish-
ment; (3) provide for the treatment of those it commits; and (4)
establish a system under which committed persons may be
released after the "briefest time" in confinement.85 If a sex
offender involuntary commitment statute meets these criteria,
the statute will probably be upheld as constitutional. This sec-
tion will discuss each of these criteria.
1. Mental Disorder Required
Under the first criteria implicitly established in Allen, an
existing mental disorder is a prerequisite for the involuntary
commitment of a sex offender.
As noted earlier, the constitutionally permissible purpose
of police power civil commitment is to treat the individual's
mental disorder and to protect the person and society from the
person's potential dangerousness.' If a person may be com-
mitted without having a mental disorder, then, there is nothing
to treat.8 7 If there is nothing to treat, commitment for the pur-
pose of treatment will not serve the purpose of the state's
police power commitment authority; commitment would sim-
ply effect preventive detention.""
The Illinois Sexually Dangerous Persons Act serves the
legitimate police power purpose of treating those the State
commits. The Act requires that the person have a "mental dis-
N.E.2d 690, 695 (Ill. 1985), aff'd 478 U.S. 364 (1986). Second, the Illinois Court applied
the due process balancing test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976),
concluding that due process did not independently require the application of the
privilege against self-incrimination. People v. Allen, 481 N.E.2d at 696.
83. The majority also concluded that the Due Process Clause did not
independently require application of the privilege against self-incrimination. Allen,
478 U.S. at 367.
84. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell, White, and O'Connor joined in the
majority opinion. Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and
Blackmun dissented.
85. Allen, 478 U.S. at 370.
86. See supra notes 41-47 and accompanying text.
87. See infra notes 154 and 155 and accompanying text.
88. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
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order" for at least one year prior to initiation of commitment
proceedings.8 9 The term mental disorder is clinically recog-
nized.9 In applying this commitment prerequisite, the State of
Illinois has only sought the commitment of persons having
clinically recognized mental disorders. For example, during
commitment proceedings, petitioner Terry Allen was diag-
nosed as having schizophrenia for at least one year prior to the
petition's filing.9 ' Schizophrenia is a clinically recognized
mental disorder.92 Thus, by requiring a clinically recogized
mental disorder, the Act ensures that the legitimate police
power goal is served; it offers bona fide treatment for the com-
mitted person's mental illness.
Given the fact that treatment of an individual's mental dis-
order is required for police power commitments and the fact
that the Illinois Act requires a finding of mental disorder,
Allen seems to establish that a finding of existing mental disor-
der is required to meet constitutional standards for police
power sex offender commitment.
2. Disavowal of Any Interest in Punishment
Under the second prong of the Allen test, the state must
disavow any interest in punishing the person it seeks to com-
mit for the underlying sex offense.9" The Supreme Court
agreed in Allen that where a defendant provides the clearest
proof that the statutory scheme is so punitive either in purpose
or effect as to negate the State's intention that the proceeding
be civil, the scheme fails to meet constitutional requirements
for civil commitment statutes.94
What evidence will the Court consider in determining
whether the purpose of a statute is punitive? In Allen, the
Court gave credence to the statute's recitation of legislative
intent that proceedings under the Act "shall be civil in
nature"; however, the Court conceded that the civil label
89. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, 105-1.01 (Smith-Hurd 1980 & Supp. 1991). See also
supra notes 64 and 65 and accompanying text.
90. See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS, DSM-III-R xxii (3d ed. rev. 1987) [hereinafter DSM-III-R].
91. Brief for Respondent at 3, Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364 (1986) (No. 85-5404).
92. See DSM-III-R, supra note 90, at 187-98.
93. Allen, 478 U.S. at 370.
94. See id. at 369. The Court's narrow holding stated that if the statute was so
punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate a civil label, the statute was criminal,
and the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination must be applied. Id.
89519921
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would not be dispositive 5
More importantly, for present purposes, the Court empha-
sized the exclusive treatment election required by the Illinois
Act.9 6 The Court reiterated that under the Illinois statute, the
State must elect either to convict the accused and punish him
for the criminal act or to civilly commit the person and
attempt treatment.9 7 The State could not both punish and then
treat. The Court contrasted a juvenile delinquency proceeding
in which the state, in spite of the "delinquency" label, also
intended to punish its juvenile offenders through institutional
commitment.98
Thus, Allen strongly suggests that treatment must be the
exclusive purpose of the statute; the state may not first punish
and then treat. Therefore, Allen intimates that treatment
rather than punishment is a constitutionally required purpose
of sexual offender involuntary commitment statutes.
3. Treatment
Under the third prong of the Allen test, the state must
provide treatment for those it commits.9 9 Recall that the Illi-
nois Sexually Dangerous Persons Act requires the state to
prove that the person has had a mental disorder for at least
one year immediately prior to the commitment proceeding.'0°
In support of its conclusion that the proceedings were civil,
the Allen Court looked to the treatment provisions of the stat-
ute. The Court noted that the statute required the state to
provide "care and treatment designed to effect recovery" in a
facility set aside to provide psychiatric care.' 0 ' Because the Illi-
nois Act provides for compulsory psychiatric care of persons
suffering from a "mental disorder," the Court found a mean-
95. 1d.
96. See supra notes 66-70 and accompanying text for a discussion of the required
election.
97. Allen, 478 U.S. at 373. The Court stated: "[Under the Illinois Sexually
Dangerous Persons Act], the State serves its purpose of treating rather than punishing
sexually dangerous persons by committing them to an institution expressly designed
to provide psychiatric care and treatment." Id. (emphasis added).
98. Id. at 373, discussing In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 49-50 (1967).
99. Similarly, in the context of parens patriae commitments, the U.S. Supreme
Court has held that it is unconstitutional to confine a mentally ill individual under an
involuntary commitment statute for the purpose of treating the individual and
subsequently to fail to treat him. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 576 (1975).
100. ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 38, 105-1.01 (Smith-Hurd 1980).
101. Allen, 478 U.S. at 369 (quoting ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, 105-4 (Smith-Hurd
1980)).
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ingful distinction between involuntary commitment under the
Act and a criminal prosecution."0 2 Accordingly, to meet consti-
tutional standards for sex offender involuntary commitment
schemes, the state must provide bona fide treatment for those
committed.
4. Committed Persons May Be Released After the Briefest
Time in Confinement
Under the fourth Allen criteria, the state must release
committed sex offenders after the briefest time in confinement
necessary to effect recovery. The Court noted that the Illinois
statute required patients to be discharged when they were no
longer dangerous. 0 3 The Court also noted that a committed
person may apply for release at any time' °4 and that the com-
mitting court is obligated to hear all applications for release.' 5
The Court considered this mandatory release requirement and
the procedures readily available to the committed person to
apply for release as further evidence that "the State has
disavowed any interest in punishment," foregoing "either of
'the traditional aims of punishment-retribution and
deterrence.' "10'
Allen, therefore, strongly suggests a fourth constitutional
requirement for sex offender involuntary commitment
schemes: the person must be released after the "briefest time
in confinement"'0 7 under easily accessible applying procedures
for applying for release.
IV. WASHINGTON'S SEX OFFENDER INVOLUNTARY
COMMITMENT SYSTEM COMPARED TO THE ILLINOIS
SEXUALLY DANGEROUS PERSONS ACT
Similar to the Illinois statute, the Washington Sexually
Violent Predators statute characterizes its commitment pro-
ceedings as civil. Like the Illinois statute, the Washington stat-
102. Cf. Brief for Respondent at 9, Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364 (1986) (No. 85-
5404).
103. Allen, 478 U.S. at 369 (citing ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, 105-9 (Smith-Hurd
1980)).
104. Id. (citing ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, 105-9 (Smith-Hurd 1980)).
105. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
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ute suggests that its proceedings are intended to be civil.108
However, the Washington statute is fundamentally different
from the Illinois statute, and it cannot rationally be character-
ized as a legitimate exercise of the state's civil commitment
authority.
The Washington law is fundamentally different from the
Illinois Sexually Dangerous Persons Act in three crucial areas:
(1) persons who are not mentally ill are subject to commit-
ment; (2) commitment and treatment follow conviction and
punishment (persons are both punished and treated); and (3)
persons committed face higher procedural hurdles before
release than persons committed under the Illinois statute.
A. Mental Disorder Not Required
Recall that the Illinois Sexually Dangerous Persons Act
requires that the person to be committed must have a mental
disorder existing for one year prior to the commitment pro-
ceedings."i 9 Although the Illinois Act does not define "mental
disorder," that term has clinical significance. Mental disorders
have recognized symptoms classified under a medical system of
disease for purposes of diagnosis and treatment." ° The Wash-
ington Act allows commitment of persons having no such clini-
cally recognized mental disorders. In fact, the law specifically
applies to persons who do not have a mental disease or
defect.'-"
Under the Washington Sexually Violent Predators statute,
a person is subject to commitment if the person is a "sexually
violent predator," having a "mental abnormality or personality
disorder" 2 which makes the person likely to engage in preda-
tory" 3 acts of sexual violence.""14 The statute defines "mental
108. See WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.010 (Supp. 1990-91).
109. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, 1 105-1.01 (Smith-Hurd 1980).
110. See Amicus Curiae Brief of the Washington State Psychiatric Ass'n at 3, In re
Young (Wash. filed Sept. 20, 1991) (No. 57837-1) [hereinafter WSPA Brief].
111. See WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.010 (Supp. 1990-91). Compare the Sexually
Violent Predators statute, id., with the Washington Involuntary Treatment Act (ITA),
WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.050 (1989) (requiring a finding of a "mental disorder," inter
alia, to commit a person).
112. The statute does not define "personality disorder."
113. "Predatory" acts are those "directed toward strangers or individuals with
whom a relationship has been established or promoted for the primary purpose of
victimization." Id. § 71.09.020(3) (Supp. 1990-91).
114. Id. § 71.09.020(1). In effect, this provision requires a prediction of the
individual's long-term future dangerousness. The ability of mental health
professionals to predict long-term future dangerousness is severely limited, as many
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abnormality" as a "congenital or acquired condition affecting
the emotional or volitional capacity, which predisposes the per-
son to the commission of criminal sexual acts" to a degree that
the person is a menace to the health and safety of others.115 In
other words, the law equates criminal behavior with mental ill-
ness; it does not require an independent mental disorder
finding.
Mere criminal deviant behavior, however, does not per se
constitute a mental disorder.116 As the American Psychiatric
Association states: "Neither deviant behavior, e.g., political,
religious, or sexual, nor conflicts that are primarily between
the individual and society are mental disorders unless the devi-
ance or conflict is a symptom of dysfunction in the person.""'
Further, most sex offenders commit crimes for the same rea-
sons as other offenders, not because they are mentally ill."'
Therefore, the commission of a sex crime does not mean that
the person is mentally ill. The Washington law thus differs
from the Illinois law in that it does not require a finding of
mental disorder.
The Washington law differs from the Illinois law with
respect to the mental disorder component in yet another
respect. Unlike the Illinois Act, the Washington law fails to
require that the person being committed have an existing
mental disorder. Recall that under the Illinois Act, in addition
to the independent mental disorder requirement, commitment
proceedings must be based on a new criminal charge.1 9 Thus,
the new criminal charge requirement reinforces the require-
ment that the person have a mental disorder continuously for
at least one year immediately before commitment proceedings.
The Illinois law's new criminal charge requirement supports
the independent finding that the person has a currently
existing mental disorder at the time commitment proceedings
commentators and courts have recognized. See, e.g., State v. Barnes, 117 Wash. 2d 701,
709-10, 818 P.2d 1088, 1092 (1991); La Fond, supra note 37 at 511-12; John Monahan,
Risk Assessment of Violence Among the Mentally Disordered. Generating Useful
Knowledge, 11 INT'L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 249 (1988); Stephen J. Morse, A Preference
for Liberty: The Case Against Involuntary Commitment of the Mentally Disordered,
70 CAL. L. REV. 54, 62-63, 73-75 (1982); see also infra notes 153-57 and accompanying
text.
115. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.020(2) (Supp. 1990-91).
116. See DSM-III-R, supra note 90, at xxii.
117. Id.
118. See WSPA Brief, supra note 110, at 3-4.
119. See supra notes 66 and 67 and accompanying text.
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are brought. In contrast, under the Washington law, a person
may be committed even if many years have passed between the
criminal sexual offense and initiation of commitment proceed-
ings.12° Ergo, the commission of one sex offense long ago can-
not serve as the basis of inferring a currently existing mental
disorder. Even assuming for purposes of argument that a per-
son once committed a sexual offense because he was mentally
ill, (although as discussed earlier, most sex offenders are not
mentally i11121 ), the person may no longer be mentally ill at the
time commitment proceedings are brought against him. Conse-
quently, because the Washington law fails to require an
existing mental disorder at the time commitment proceedings
are initiated against a person, the Washington law differs sub-
stantially from the Illinois Act.
B Convict and Punish, and Commit and Treat
The Washington statute is fundamentally different from
the Illinois scheme in a second respect. Under the Illinois Sex-
ually Dangerous Persons Act, the State must elect either to
prosecute the accused for the criminal offense or seek his com-
mitment as a sexually dangerous person. 22 The State may not
both convict the person and commit him.
In sharp contrast, under the Washington statute, commit-
ment and treatment must follow conviction and punishment.
Under the Act, commitment proceedings may be brought if the
person is currently confined for a sex offense or was once con-
fined for a sex offense and has been released.1 23 Thus, in
120. The statute applies only to persons who are currently confined or who were
once confined but who have been released. See WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.030 (Supp.
1990-91). The only basis for commitment required by the law is a commission of one
qualifying sexual offense at some time in the past if the prosecutor decides that person
is a "sexually violent predator." Id.
121. See supra notes 116-18 and accompanying text.
122. People v. Patch, 293 N.E.2d 661, 665 (1973); see supra notes 66-70 and
accompanying text.
123. The law provides that a petition may be filed:
When it appears that:
(1) The sentence of a person who has been convicted of a sexually violent
offense is about to expire on, before, or after July 1, 1990;
(2) the term of confinement of a person found to have committed a sexually
violent offense as a juvenile is about to expire, or has expired on, before,
or after July 1, 1990;
(3) a person who has been charged with a sexually violent offense and who
has been determined to be incompetent to stand trial is about to be
released, or has been released on, before, or after July 1, 1990, pursuant to
RCW 10.77.090(3); or
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Washington, commitment under the Act is supplementary to a
conviction and punishment for the sex offense (or the
equivalent if the person was found to be mentally
incompetent) .124
C. Duration of Confinement; Procedures for Release
Under both the Illinois and Washington statutes, the per-
son committed will be confined for an indefinite period of
time.'25 Under the Illinois Act, however, the person may file
an application showing that he has recovered and petition for
release at any time following commitment. 126 The person is
entitled to a review of his case every six months.127  In addi-
tion, the Illinois statute provides for the conditional release of
persons committed. 128 The person must prove, by a preponder-
ance of the evidence, that he is no longer dangerous. 29
In contrast, the Washington statute is considerably more
restrictive in its release provisions than the Illinois statute.
Under the Washington Act, a petition for release is authorized
when the Department of Social and Health Services deter-
mines that the person's mental abnormality or personality dis-
order has so changed that the person is not likely to commit
predatory acts of sexual violence if released.'
(4) a person who has been found not guilty by reason of insanity of a sexually
violent offense is about to be released, or has been released on, before, or
after July 1, 1990, pursuant to RCW 10.77.090(3);
and it appears that the person may be a sexually violent predator...
WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.030 ( Supp. 1990-91).
124. Contrast the repealed Washington sexual psychopathy statute, WASH. REV.
CODE ch. 71.06 (1989), repealed prospectively by 1984 Wash. Laws ch. 209 (codified at
WASH. REV. CODE § 71.06.005 (1989)). Under this prior commitment system, the
prosecution could initiate a sexual psychopathy commitment proceeding when the
person was charged with a sex offense. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.06.020 (1989). If the
person was found to be a sexual psychopath, the court could order the person to be
committed; if the court did not find the person to be a sexual psychopath, the court
ordered the person to serve his sentence for the crime or discharge him, as the case
merited. Id. § 71.06.060. Under this statute, unlike the present Sexually Violent
Predators statute, the person was not both punished for the crime and subsequently
committed for treatment. Cf WASH. REV. CODE ch. 71.09 (Supp. 1990-91).
125. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, 105-8 (Smith-Hurd 1980 & Supp. 1991); WASH.
REV. CODE § 71.09.060 (Supp. 1990-91).
126. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, V 105-9 (Smith-Hurd 1980). The Department of
Corrections is required to submit a sociopsychiatric report in response. Id. The
application is heard by the same court that originally committed the person.
127. 8 Ill. Reg. 14501 (1984).
128. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, 105-10 (Smith-Hurd 1980).
129. People v. DeMont, 496 N.E.2d 1215 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986).
130. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.040 (Supp. 1990-91).
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The statute does not prohibit the person from petitioning
for release over the Department's objection. Apparently, such
a petition for release will only be considered when the Depart-
ment provides the committed person with an annual written
notification of the person's right to petition for release. 131 If
the committed person petitions for release over the Depart-
ment's objection, the person must prevail at a show cause hear-
ing to obtain the right to a trial on his petition.1
2
In contrast, recall that under the Illinois Act, the court
must hear all petitions for release, regardless of whether the
Department of Corrections concurred with the petition.
133
Also, under the Washington statute, if the first petition is
denied, virtually all subsequent petitions without the Depart-
ment's approval are likely to be denied.134 Further, in contrast
to the Illinois statute, a person committed under the Washing-
ton scheme is only entitled to an annual review of his condi-
tion.135  Finally, in contrast to the Illinois statute the
Washington statute does not provide for any type of condi-
tional release. 36
V. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF WASHINGTON'S SEX
OFFENDER INVOLUNTARY COMMITMENT SYSTEM
UNDER ALLEN V. ILLINOIS
If a state sex offender involuntary commitment scheme
fails under any one of the four criteria suggested by Allen, the
statute will fail as an unconstitutional exercise of the state's
civil commitment authority. The Washington statute fails to
meet all four criteria: (1) an existing mental disorder is not
131. Id
132. Id.
133. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, 105-09 (Smith-Hurd 1980).
134. See WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.100 (Supp. 1990-91). This section provides:
[I]f a person has previously filed a petition for discharge without the
[Department's] approval and the court determined, either upon review of the
petition or following a hearing, that the petitioner's petition was frivolous or
that the petitioner's condition had not so changed that he or she was safe to be
at large, then the court shall deny the subsequent petition unless the petition
contains facts upon which a court could find that the condition of the
petitioner had so changed that a hearing was warranted.
Id.
135. See id. § 71.09.070.
136. The repealed sexual psychopathy statute allowed the conditional release of a
committed person. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 71.06.091, .130 (1989), repealed
prospectively by 1984 Wash. Laws ch. 209 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 71.06.005
(1989)).
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required for commitment; (2) punishment is embraced, not dis-
avowed; (3) committed persons will not be treated; and (4)
committed persons will not be released after the briefest time
in confinement; they will face numerous procedural barriers to
applying for release.
A. Mental Disorder is Not Required
The Washington statute fails to meet the first Allen crite-
ria requiring a mental disorder. As discussed earlier, the
Washington scheme does not require that the person to be
committed have an existing mental disorder.3 7 Additionally,
mental health professionals have criticized this aspect of the
Act on policy grounds.
In recommending the new civil commitment statute, the
Governor's Task Force on Community Protection ("Task
Force")"s observed: "Under current laws, sexually violent
predators only qualify for civil detention when a mental disor-
der or mental disorder is present. The Task Force examined
the histories of some individual violent predators who had
been judged not to have a mental disorder or mental disorder
and therefore were not detainable.'' s9  Thus, the statute
adopted the Task Force's recommendations: persons who are
not mentally ill may be committed under the Act.
Additionally, the chief policy criticism advanced by mental
health professionals is that the Washington system does not
require a finding of mental disorder. In opposing enactment of
the commitment statute, the Washington State Psychiatric
Association (WSPA) stated:
[the commitment system] will confuse mental disorder with
violent sexual behavior. Mental illnesses are specific condi-
tions that result in a loss of contact with reality and can be
treated with medication and therapy. Violent sexual behav-
ior is just that-behavior that is always under voluntary con-
trol. The rapist or pedophile must decide to commit the
sexual act-the mental patient cannot.
1 40
137. See supra notes 86-92 and accompanying text (discussing the Allen mental
illness requirement); see also supra notes 109-121 and accompanying text (discussing
the Washington statute).
138. See supra note 24.
139. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 24, at 11-21 (emphasis added).
140. See Bodine, supra note 3, at 106 n.13 (citing Dr. James Reardon, Testimony
before the 1990 Washington State Legislature (January 1990) at 1). Dr. Reardon's
testimony was given on behalf of the WSPA. See id,
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The WSPA argued that the statute requires reliance on
the concepts of "mental abnormality" and "personality disor-
der"'141 because the legislature recognized that sexual offenses
are rarely the product of mental disorder.142 However, the
Association stated that the term "mental abnormality" is hope-
lessly vague and has no clinical significance. 143 "Abnormality"
is no longer used because it has several different meanings:
not typical; not average; not natural; not expected.14 4 The
WSPA then applied these observations about sex offenders and
mental disorder to existing state statutes providing for the civil
commitment of sex offenders. The WSPA noted that these
facts regarding mental disorder have resulted in "a pronounced
rejection of the view that sex offenders have an identifiable ill-
ness or disorder."' 45 This view is reiterated by Brakel, Parry
and Weiner:
Growing awareness that there is no specific group of individ-
uals who can be labeled sexual psychopaths by acceptable
medical standards and that there are no proven treatments
for such offenders has led such professional groups as the
Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry, the President's
Commission on Mental Health, and most recently, the
American Bar Association Committee on Criminal Justice
Mental Health Standards to urge that these [sexual psycho-
path] laws be repealed. 46
Because persons who are not mentally ill are subject to
involuntary commitment under the Washington statute, the
statute fails under the first Allen criteria. Accordingly, the
Washington statute is probably unconstitutional and, in addi-
tion, represents a poor policy choice by the Legislature.
B. Punishment is Embraced, Not Disavowed
The Washington statute fails to meet the second Allen cri-
teria: the state has not disavowed all interest in punishing the
committed person. The Washington statute authorizes civil
commitment of a person adjudged to be a "sexually violent
141. WSPA Brief, supra note 110, at 7-9 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.020(2)
(Supp. 1990-91)). See supra notes 112-118 and accompanying text for a further
discussion of these terms.
142. WSPA Brief, supra note 110, at 7.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. WSPA Brief, supra note 110, at 5.
146. BRAKEL ET AL., supra note 9, at 743 (citations omitted).
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predator," in addition to criminal penalties previously served
for the criminal conviction. 47 In contrast, the Illinois Sexually
Dangerous Persons Act allows treatment through the civil
commitment process as an alternative to criminal proceed-
ings. 4 ' If punishment and treatment are to be effected consec-
utively, and not alternatively, the Washington statute clearly
has not "disavowed all interest in punishment" as Allen
requires. On the contrary, the Washington statute embraces
both fully punishing a person for his criminal acts, and then
requiring him to be treated for sexual deviancy. Thus, the
Washington statute clearly does not meet the second Allen
criteria.
Additionally, the statute's purpose demonstrates that the
State has not disavowed all interest in punishing offenders
committed under the statute. The Task Force Report provides
evidence of the State's continuing interest in punishing persons
committed under the Act. For example, the Task Force's
stated objective was to find "ways to confine repeat violent
offenders who present an extreme safety risk."' 49 The Task
Force further noted that it was principally created to answer
one question: "What gaps in our law and administrative struc-
tures allow the release of known dangerous offenders who are
highly likely to commit very serious crimes?"'150 The Task
Force then focused on the offenders and the inadequacy of
their sentences.
15 '
147. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.030 (Supp. 1990-91); see supra note 124.
148. See supra notes 66-70 and accompanying text.
149. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 24, at I-1.
150. Id. at 11-20.
151. The Task Force found:
Offenders committed under the Sentencing Reform Act are sentenced to a
definite term. The most serious offenders are supervised in the community
for one year following release. When the confinement and supervision term
expire, the state's control over these offenders ceases. State prison inmates
sentenced under the indeterminate system (crimes committed before 1984)
serve terms set by the Indeterminate Sentence Review Board and are released
when they are "fit subjects for release." Some offenders are never found
eligible for parole and serve their entire maximum term in prison; the
majority are placed on parole. The Board loses all jurisdiction over the
offender when the statutory maximum for the crime expires (five year for
Class C felonies, ten years for Class B, and life for Class A). Many offenders
who committed very serious crimes and are viewed as very dangerous were
convicted of Class B offenses. The juvenile system loses all jurisdiction on
juvenile offenders when they turn 18, unless the jurisdiction is extended by
the juvenile court before the offender turns 18 and then the age is extended to
21. Persons found Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity under the criminal
insanity law may be held for the statutory maximum of the crime they
9051992]
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Finally, the Task Force concluded that "existing laws do
not offer a sufficient safety net for confinement of sexually
violent predators."'52 The Task Force never stated that the
objective of the involuntary commitment statute was to treat
the persons committed. Rather, the Task Force only articu-
lated the desire to isolate potentially dangerous persons from
members of the community.
In short, under the Washington statute, the State has not
disavowed all interest in punishing the person committed, as
Allen suggests is required for constitutional sex offender com-
mitment statutes. Indeed, the State punishes the person for
the offense first and later treats the person for his sexual devi-
ancy. Because the statute does not meet this second Allen cri-
terion for sex offender commitment statutes, the Washington
statute appears to impose unconstitutional lifetime preventive
detention.
C. Treatment
Under the third criteria suggested by Allen to meet consti-
tutional standards, a sex offender involuntary commitment
statute must provide for the treatment of persons commit-
ted.'53 The Washington statute fails to meet this requirement.
The Washington statute does not-indeed, it cannot-pur-
sue treatment because the Act does not apply to a treatable
mental condition. The Washington Act itself asserts that per-
sons subject to commitment under the Act do not suffer from a
mental disease or defect." In the absence of a mental disor-
committed or until their mental illness is stabilized and they no longer
present a danger to others. They can be held beyond the statutory maximum
if they are found dangerous to self or others and are detained under the
involuntary treatment law. Persons found incompetent to stand trial can be
held for up to one year and 15 days (90 days if the person is developmentally
disabled) in order to re-establish their competency. If competency cannot be
re-established, the charges are dismissed without prejudice (charges can be
refiled if the person regains competency at a later time). A person found
incompetent to stand trial can be referred to a state hospital and held under
the involuntary treatment law if the person is dangerous to self or others or is
gravely disabled.
Id. at 11-20 to 11-21.
152. Id. at 11-21.
153. See supra notes 99-102 and accompanying text.
154. "The legislature finds that a small . . . group of sexually violent predators
exist who do not have a mental disease or defect that renders them appropriate for the
existing involuntary treatment act ...." WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.010 (Supp. 1990-91)
(emphasis added). Further, the Task Force reported that under the Involuntary
Treatment Act, "sexually violent predators" only qualify for civil detention when a
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der, nothing exists to treat. 5
Consequently, when the Washington law purports to pro-
vide treatment for those committed,' 56 there is a clear non
sequitur. The provision of "treatment" seems all the more dis-
ingenuous given the legislature's explicit finding that sexually
violent predators are unamenable to existing mental disorder
treatment methods.5 7
Finally, there is no known effective therapy for sex
offenders treated involuntarily. Indeed, in one recent study,
researchers concluded: "[w]e can... say with confidence there
is no evidence that treatment effectively reduces sex offense
recidivism. '"1 5'
mental illness or mental disorder is present. Thus, some persons were not detainable
because they did not have the requisite illness or disorder. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra
note 24, at 11-21. The Task Force's proposed civil commitment statute was thus aimed
at committing individuals who were not mentally ill or disordered. See id. Mental
health experts have criticized this provision because the statute does not purport to
characterize sex offenders as mentally ill or developmentally disabled in any clinically
meaningful sense. See supra notes 140-45; see also Maria Williams, Mental Health
Experts Criticize Sex-Predator Law, THE SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 25, 1990, at B4; Ron
Judd, Psychiatrists Challenge State's Law on Sexual Predators, THE SEATTLE TIMES,
Jan. 4, 1991, at Al.
155. The Washington State Psychiatric Association states that mental illness can
be treated with medication and therapy. See Bodine, supra note 3, at 106 n.13 (citing
Dr. James Reardon, Testimony before 1990 Washington State Legislature (January
1990), at 1). Mere violent sexual behavior, in the absence of a mental illness, cannot be
treated because it is always under the person's voluntary control. Id. A model
involuntary commitment statute proposed by the American Psychiatric Association
would require that there be a "reasonable prospect that [the person's] disorder is
treatable" as a prerequisite for involuntary commitment. See Clifford D. Stromberg &
Alan A. Stone, Statute-A Model State Law on Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill,
20 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 275, 330, 332 (1983). The APA model law also requires that a
person have a "severe mental disorder." Id.
156. See WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.060 (Supp. 1990-91).
157. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.010 (Supp. 1990-91). This finding is in accord with
existing research on sex offender recidivism rates. See supra note 11 (discussing the
findings of California treatment methods and recidivism); see also Lita Furby et al.,
Sex Offender Recidivism. A Review, 105 PSYCHOL. BuLL. 3, 35 (1989). These
researchers conclude that "we can ... say with confidence there is no evidence that
treatment effectively reduces sex offense recidivism." Id. Indeed, their research
showed that in six of seven recidivism studies reviewed, the sex offense recidivism rate
for treated offenders was higher than for untreated offenders, albeit slightly. Id.
158. Furby et al., supra note 157, at 25. Empirically, other studies also confirm
that little difference exists in the recidivism rate between treated and untreated sex
offenders. See Resnik & Wolfgang, supra note 11; Morrow & Peterson, supra note 11.
Why are sex offenders so resistant to treatment as compared to mentally ill
individuals? One possible reason is that many sex offenders, having been diagnosed as
mentally ill on the basis of their sexual offenses, lack "significant pathology such as
psychosis, retardation, or major affective disorders." Vikki H. Sturgeon & John
Taylor, Report of a Five-Year Follow-up Study of Mentally Disordered Sex Offenders
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If persons committed under the Washington statute are
not treatable, and if the involuntary treatment of sex offenders
is ineffective, the statute serves no treatment objective. There-
fore, the statute fails to meet the third requirement for consti-
tutionally permissible involuntary civil commitment suggested
by Allen. If treatment is not the purpose of the statute, as
required by Allen, the statute effectively authorizes unconsti-
tutional long-term preventive detention.
In short, under the Washington Act, no meaningful dis-
tinction exists between involuntary commitment and criminal
prosecution because there is no treatment. The Washington
scheme uses the "promise of treatment . . . only to bring an
illusion of benevolence to what is essentially a warehousing
operation for social misfits."'" 9
D. Committed Persons Are Not Released After the Briefest
Time in Confinement
The Allen Court suggested a final constitutional require-
ment for sex offender commitment schemes: the person must
be released after the briefest time in confinement, and the
committed person must have readily available procedures
allowing him to petition for release.' 6 Under the Washington
law, the committed person will not be released after the brief-
est time in confinement.
To authorize the committed person to petition for release,
the Department of Social and Health Services must initially
find that the committed person's "mental abnormality or per-
sonality disorder has so changed that the person is not likely to
commit predatory acts of sexual violence if released .... "
Then, in a judicial hearing, to keep the person confined, the
prosecutor must show "beyond a reasonable doubt" that the
committed person is "not safe to be at large" and that if dis-
charged, the petitioner is likely to commit sexual offenses.'6 2
Essentially, the Department and the court may prevent the
from Atascadero State Hospital in 1973, 4 CRIM. JUST. J. 31, 42 (1980). In other words,
many sex offenders are not mentally ill. Traditional psychiatric treatments, however,
are usually most effective to treat mental illness. APA Brief, supra note 11, at 17. As
recently as 1986, in spite of recent innovative treatment developments, the American
Psychiatric Association remained unwilling to state that the involuntary treatment of
sex offenders can be effective. See id. at 18.
159. Cross v. Harris, 418 F.2d 1095, 1107 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
160. See supra notes 103-07 and accompanying text.
161. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.090 (Supp. 1990-91).
162. Id..
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committed person from being released based upon a finding
that the person is likely to be dangerous at some time in the
future.
The future dangerousness standard for release is problem-
atic; studies have consistently found that mental health profes-
sionals cannot accurately predict an individual's long-term
future dangerousness. 163 One researcher has concluded that
mental health professionals'6 are more often wrong than right
in predicting violent behavior over a period of several years.
165
Indeed, he concluded that psychiatrists are correct in predict-
ing future violence in only one out of three cases: ".... of every
three.., persons predicted by psychiatrists or psychologists to
be violent, one will be discovered to commit a violent act, and
two will not."'
This data indicates that mental health professionals signif-
icantly err on the side of overpredicting dangerousness.1
67
Therefore, because the Washington sex offender involuntary
commitment statute requires that the person "is not likely to
commit predatory acts of sexual violence if released," it is
unlikely that such a finding will ever be made.
Given the empirical data, two of every three persons found
to be "likely to commit predatory acts of sexual violence if
released" would not commit any such acts. Two of every three
persons committed under the Act would be unjustifiably
detained-probably for life-with no possibility of release.
Clearly, this does not meet the Allen requirement of "release
after the briefest time in confinement." Therefore, the statute
appears to sanction unconstitutional preventive detention
163. See Robert J. Menzies et al., Hitting the Forensic Sound Barrier: Predictions
of Dangerousness in a Pretrial Psychiatric Clinic, in DANGEROUSNESS: PROBABILITY
AND PREDICTION, PSYCHIATRY AND PUBLIC POLICY 115, 132 (Christopher D. Webster et
al., eds. 1985); Bruce J. Ennis & Thomas R. Litwack, Psychiatry & the Presumption of
Expertise: Flipping Coins in the Courtroom, 62 CAL. L. REV. 693, 711-16; Gleb, supra
note 6, at 222-28; La Fond, supra note 37, at 511.
164. Psychiatrists and psychologists.
165. See Monahan, supra note 113 at 250. Cf. Menzies et al., supra note 163, at 131-
32.
166. Monahan, supra note 113, at 250. For a further discussion of older studies
reaching similar conclusions on the accuracy of predicting future violence, see
generally Ennis & Litwack, supra note 163.
167. See Menzies et al., supra note 163, at 117.
Some commentators have used data on the overprediction of dangerousness to
argue that psychiatric testimony should be excluded in involuntary commitment
proceedings. See Ennis & Litwack, supra note 163, at 735-73; Gleb, supra note 6, at
240-49. Gleb argues for a constitutionally-based modification of the Frye evidentiary
test to exclude psychiatric and similar testimony. See Gleb, supra note 6, at 240-49.
1992]
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because it seeks to prevent questionable and even unlikely
future harm.
Further, as discussed earlier, the Washington statute con-
siderably restricts the committed person's opportunities to
petition for release.' 68 The committed person in Washington
faces a number of procedural barriers to applying for release,
unlike the Illinois scheme where a person may petition for
release at any time.169 Again, the Washington commitment
system fails under Allen.
Thus, the Washington statute is fundamentally different
from the Illinois Sexually Dangerous Persons Act. Further,
the statute does not meet the four criteria suggested by Allen
for constitutionally permissible involuntary civil commitments.
Therefore, the Washington statute appears to authorize uncon-
stitutional lifetime preventive detention solely to prevent con-
jectural future crime. The statute simply seeks to extend the
sentences of convicted offenders who are considered to be pos-
sible recidivists. Persons who have fully served their sentences
and are legally due for release will be pulled back into the
institutional gates.
VI. CONCLUSION
Protecting the community is a legitimate legislative goal.
A deviant sexual crime may last but minutes; the impact on
the offender's victim will last a lifetime. The trauma suffered
by their victims and their victims' families was--and is-devas-
tating. People like Earl Shriner, Gene Kane, and Gary Min-
nix 7 ' should be isolated from society to protect the public.
But Washington's new sex offender involuntary commitment
system inappropriately utilizes unconstitutional means to do
SO.
Incapacitation-i.e., isolating a person to protect the com-
munity from the dangerous individual-is a chief goal of the
criminal justice system. The criminal justice system, with its
requisite procedural protections, is the constitutionally appro-
priate means through which the goal of incapacitation can and
should be effected.
17 '
168. See supra notes 130-35 and accompanying text.
169. See supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
170. See supra note 15.
171. "[The] criminal justice system is an apparatus society uses to enforce the
standards of conduct necessary to protect individuals and the community. It operates
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Sex offenders should be punished--severely-for their
crimes-through the criminal justice system.172 To be sure,
proponents of the sex offender involuntary commitment sys-
tem argue that the statute was intended to incapacitate those
offenders who were perceived as having fallen through the
judicial and administrative cracks, or whose sentences were
perceived as inadequate. However, the Washington Commu-
nity Protection Act also amended the Sentencing Reform Act
of 1984 by imposing longer sentences for sex offenders.17
Under the revised Sentencing Reform Act, Washington
now has longer standard sentences for sex offenders. Further,
judges may impose exceptional sentences if the circumstances
warrant them. Tough sentences should be the only constitu-
tionally acceptable means of assuring that people like Earl
Shriner and Gene Kane are prevented from inflicting their
horrors on the people of the state.1 7 4
We should convict and punish sex offenders through the
criminal justice system. We should not involuntarily commit
sex offenders and subject them to disingenuous attempts at
treatment.
by apprehending, prosecuting, convicting, and sentencing those members of the
community who violate the basic rules of group existence." PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION
ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF
CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 7 (1967).
172. Accord Bodine, supra note 3, at 141; Gleb, supra note 6, at 250.
173. See 1990 Wash. Laws ch. 3. §§ 701-08.
174. Indeed, assuming that Earl Shriner's 131 1/2-year sentence stands, even if his
sentence is reduced for good time, he will never again prey outside the prison walls.
The community will never again fear his presence in the community. See supra note
23 (discussing Earl Shriner's exceptional sentence).
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